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Abstract
A substantial increase of green investments is still required to reach the Paris
Agreement’s emission targets. Yet, capital markets to expedite green invest-
ments are generically constrained. Literature has shown that governments could
de-risk such investments. Empirical beta pricing and yield estimates reveal
some public involvement in the green bonds market, especially for long ma-
turity bonds. We provide empirical evidence that Governments and Multilateral
organizations can de-risk green investments by supporting the issuance of green
bonds in contrast to private green bonds - that show higher yields, volatility and
beta prices - and conventional energy bonds, that are more volatile due to oil
price variations. Since lower betas also mean lower capital costs, we use those
empirical results and run a dynamic model with two types of firms, modeling the
economic behavior of innovators (renewable energy firms) and incumbents (fos-
sil fuel firms). The simulations of our model show that de-risked interest rates
help to phase in renewable energy firms in the market and avoid a sharp debt
increase. However, when the new entrants carry negative pay-offs for a longer
time, it might not be sufficient to keep the debt low and to avoid a shake-out
in the market. Subsidies and carbon taxation can complement the role of the
de-risked interest rates and expedite the energy transition. Beside deterministic
model variants, we also explore a stochastic version of the model.
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1 Introduction
Since 2009, when the 15th Conference of the Parties (COP 15) to the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) took place in
Copenhagen, climate finance has come to the forefront. This movement was fol-
lowed by international climate agreements1 that fostered the public and private
sector mobilization of financial resources and the development of new financial
tools.
Governments have a role in providing funding and in risk-bearing in-
vestments that exhibit higher externalities and uncertainties by reducing risk
premia for such projects (Arrow & Lind, 1970; Stiglitz, 1993). There is often
uncertainty on environmental costs of projects which provides incentives for re-
ducing the risk premia through public investment (Arrow & Fisher, 1974). This
is also true for the implementation of renewable energies, especially in developing
countries: the higher fixed and upfront costs vis-a-vis fossil fuel projects demand
a de-risking effort for green investments (Ondraczek et al., 2015; Sweerts et al.,
2019; Waissbein et al., 2013).
Green bonds can play a relevant role for this purpose (Flaherty et al.,
2017; Orlov et al., 2018). It provides an instrument to implement Sachs’ (2014)
idea of “intertemporal burden sharing”. The cost of climate policies can be
shared by current and future generations through debt finance. Governments
and Multilateral organizations are key agents with respect to phasing in green
bonds into the asset markets. Moreover, asset holders need to be induced to
hold green bonds into their portfolio which in turn depends on the performance
of green bonds in the financial market. This in turn is likely to reduce the
capital cost of green investments and aid to transform the energy system.
The issuance of green bonds has risen as an innovative instrument to
finance sustainable projects. Since 2007, more than 3,000 bonds were issued
by Governments, Private and Multilateral organizations mobilizing more than
US$ 414 billion. The green bonds are fixed-income securities, usually certified
by a third-party, to leverage resources in the capital market. The external cer-
tification guarantees that the proceeds are used for sustainable projects only,
such as renewable energy, green buildings and clean transport. The green bonds
1In 2009, through the Copenhagen Accord, the international community agreed on fi-
nancing US$ 100 billion per year for sustainable projects in developing countries. In 2010,
the Cancun Agreement mobilized Governments to keep global temperatures well-bellow 2ºC
above the pre-industrial level. In 2015, the Paris Agreement stressed this temperature goal,
keeping the target but encouraging a further effort to reach 1.5ºC.
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decrease portfolio risks and solve investors’ information constraints which can
attract resources owned by private institutional investors2, especially those with
better ESG practices. One has also become aware of the financial instability
risks of holding carbon-intensive assets (Carney, 2015). While climate change
increases financial risks and investment needs, the macro environment and quan-
titative easing policy (QE) induce lower asset returns (Morana & Sbrana, 2019).
Nevertheless, institutional investors can be crowded-in if public agents use its
de-risk potential (IFA WG, 2017).
This paper discusses the role of green bonds and verifies whether or
not the Governments and Multilateral organizations can de-risk these bonds as
a strategy to increase green investments. We calculate bond yields and beta
prices and find that Governments and Multilateral organizations can de-risk
green projects by acting as an issuer of green bonds or by initiating policies
supporting green bonds.
The paper also studies the impact of this strategy on the implementa-
tion path of renewable energy in the context of a dynamic model. Our model is
influenced by the evolutionary approach in economics (Arthur, 1989). It is also
related to the work of dynamic limit pricing - as in Judd & Petersen (1985),
Gaskins (1971) and Kato & Semmler (2011) where, however, the incumbent is
dominantly pursuing an intertemporal strategy of profit maximizing. We run
a small-scale model of two types of firms studying the performance of the in-
novators (renewable firms) and the incumbents (fossil fuel firms). We assume
that the market entrants (innovators), pursuing the supply of renewable energy,
exhibit an intertemporal pay-off function. We also introduce a debt dynamics
for the innovators and explore analytically the debt sustainability. The model
is designed to explore the market impact of the de-risking strategy on the im-
plementation of renewable technologies. We also evaluate a stochastic version
of the model and a model variant with taxes on the carbon sector and subsidies
for green activities3.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the theoreti-
cal background that justifies the role of the public sector in capital markets and
in environmental projects. Section 3 gives a brief overview of the Bloomberg
database of corporate green bonds and studies the beta prices and returns for
2Institutional investors hold around US$ 120 trillion in assets (Bielenberg et al., 2016)
while only 1.5% of climate finance is provided by this type of agent (CPI, 2019).
3A discussion about the interaction of carbon taxation and green bonds is also set by Heine
et al. (2019) and Steckel & Jakob (2018).
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de-risked bonds. Based on those results, section 4 introduces the dynamic model
of the two types of firms and proves under what conditions debt sustainability
can be achieved. Section 5 presents the results from the numerical simulations
and introduces a stochastic version of the model. Section 6 concludes the paper.
The appendix presents the solution procedure of the model, the data background
and an evaluation of the volatility of the returns of green and fossil fuel bonds.
2 The role of the public sector in climate finance
Although the role of the public sector in climate finance has increased, the
great needs for climate finance demands complementary credit sources. Credit
dynamics is key for understanding investment and growth (Faulwasser et al.,
2018; Gertler & Bernanke, 1989). However, asymmetric information, moral
hazard and adverse selection can explain credit costs and credit rationing given
the relationship between borrowers and lenders and the existence of information
constraints (Akerlof, 1970; Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). Due to market imperfections,
the Government may intervene in the credit market to reduce credit constraints
and foster investment for certain types of projects.
Indeed, Governments are able to provide funding and fix market failures
associated with costly information in credit markets. When markets are missing
and incomplete, the Government can also act as a risk-bearing agent (Stiglitz,
1993). According to the Arrow-Lind Theorem, under uncertainty, projects with
social benefits and with publicly born risks can have lower cost of risk-bearing
as the State can distribute it across taxpayers (Arrow & Lind, 1970). Further-
more, public sector’s equity and bond issuing can reduce the risk premia and
generate a liquidity premium in contrast to private agents (Grant & Quiggin,
2003; Holmstro¨m & Tirole, 1998).
However, the role of the public sector and its capacity to buffer risk-
bearing projects is unequal between countries. Capital market imperfections
and distinct sovereign risk perceptions impact the weighted average cost of cap-
ital (WACC)4. It also limits the public capacity to de-risk activities with high
4The WACC for renewable energy projects in Africa varies from 8% to 32% in a sample of
46 countries (Sweerts et al., 2019). For better rated European countries (Figure B.1, Appendix
B), the capital cost in 2017 varies from 1.43% (France) to 4.53% (Greece). For non-European
countries (Figure B.2, Appendix B), 25% of the countries have credit costs above 14% while
only 9% of them have a credit cost below 4%.
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externalities. Nevertheless, the public sector can help to direct financial market
resources toward the implementation of green technologies.
First, the cost of capital depends also on firms’ asset prices and on the
industry life cycle. Small, medium and start-up firms in innovative industries
are frequently financially constrained and face a higher cost of capital (Hall &
Lerner, 2010). Innovative small firms follow a financial growth cycle in which
financial needs change as the business grows or the investment needs increase5.
Moreover, there is evidence that the bond market, instead of the equity market,
explains better the investment behavior of firms (Philippon, 2009; Semmler &
Mateane, 2012).
Second, as to environmental investments and credit markets, Fisher
(1973) reviews the Arrow-Lind Theorem and finds that there is an uncertain cost
of such projects that may affect the performance of investment. This uncertainty
entails an adjustment of an investment’s expected benefits and, as these costs
are hard to measure and to identify, public policy should attempt to internalize
them (Arrow & Fisher, 1974).
Third, initially, the monetary cost of green investments can be high
which reinforces the need of public policy in de-risking those investments. The
implementation of renewable technologies faces higher fixed upfront costs in
comparison with fossil fuel investments, especially in developing countries (On-
draczek et al., 2015; Sweerts et al., 2019; Waissbein et al., 2013). These new
technologies are operated at a lower scale of production and are usually ex-
pensive in terms of set-up costs. Yet, as to recent trends of green technology,
the global costs for renewable energy have decreased and tend to be cheaper
than the fossil fuel cost of production (Figure 1)6. This price decrease is due
to economies of scale and to the infinite supply of renewable energy but also
due to public policy support aimed at reducing credit risk and guaranteeing
the implementation of new technologies with high externalities and significant
uncertainties7.
5From seed capital and venture capital to debt and equity (Berger & Udell, 1998) or from
internal to external finance, using first debt and then equity (Semmler, 2011).
6Gimon & O’Boyle (2019) find that, for the US in 2018, 74% of the national coal supply
is at risk.
7For environmental projects, Governments and international institutions often pursue loan
guarantees, new regulatory frameworks, risk insurance, investment in portfolios with higher
risk technologies and the issuance and purchase of green bonds (Steckel & Jakob, 2018, Mazzu-
cato & Semieniuk, 2018). In 2017, Governments expenditures to implement renewable-based
electricity were around US$ 143 billion, which represented 19% of the total investment em-
ployed in the electricity sector (IEA, 2018). Most public support was for solar and wind energy
(80%). China, Germany, United States, Japan and Italy employed 2/3 of the total support.
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Figure 1: Levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) for renewable energy sources
versus fossil fuels (USD per MwH - 2009/2019), Note: The LCOE was obtained
through Bloomberg. The references for coal and natural gas are for the US only
while the others are global assessments. The “Fossil Fuel Highest Cost” for 2018
was estimated by IRENA (2019)
However, we should note that public and private actors interact in the
financial markets. Some authors argue that investors pay the same price for
green and conventional bonds, i.e. there is a zero “green premium” (Larcker &
Watts, 2019; Hyun et al., 2019). We discuss, in the next section, that a green
bond yield analysis should take into account the different issuers profiles. This
debate sheds light on the yield sensitivity of investors for green bonds and how
its related with the bond profile.
Several factors - such as maturity, bond rating, countries or issuers
debt, market conditions and liquidity - determine the bond yields. Investment
grade green bonds perform differently than other green bonds (Kuhn et al.,
2018; Hachenberg & Schiereck, 2018). Green bonds can be more liquid than
conventional bonds, depending on the bonds profile (Bachelet et al., 2019; Febi
et al., 2018). The nature of the issuer (if it’s public or not) and whether the
green bond is certified by a third-part or not also matter for the liquidity and
yields, i.e. the green reputation of the bond allows lower yields (Bachelet et
al., 2019; Fatica et al., 2019; Kapraun & Scheins, 2019). Furthermore, green
bond issuing attracts long-term investors who value environmental gains which
impacts liquidity, demand and lower yields (Flammer, 2018; Baker et al., 2018;
In the United States, explicit federal subsidies to renewable sources were US$ 15 billion in
2013 and US$ 6.7 billion in 2016, representing 46% of the total subsidies for the energy sector
(EIA, 2018). Due to this effort, the levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) for renewable energy is
from 2% to 9% lower than a similar non-subsidized investment in the country (Lazard, 2018).
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Karpf & Mandel, 2018; Partridge & Medda, 2018; Nanayakkara & Colombage,
2018; Zerbib, 2019; Hachenberg & Schiereck, 2018). Therefore, the green bond’s
characteristics and the nature of the issuer matters for green bonds analysis. For
that reason, our empirics and modeling analysis in the following section consider
the different yields for Private, Public and Multilateral issuers.
As information constraints are relaxed for green bonds, new institu-
tional investors concerned with ESG practices and aware of climate transition
risks can be attracted8. Market agents report that green bonds attract new
investors (Climate Bonds Initiative, 2018) and allow known institutional in-
vestors to gain exposure to climate-friendly assets (Venugopal, 2015). The use
of de-risking tools by public agents - with higher rating and credibility - can
turn green bonds to be even more attractive to institutional investors (IFA WG,
2017).
Investors’ pro-environmental preferences add up to the hedging role
of green securities as an incentive to attract institutional investors. The lit-
erature shows that green bonds protect investors from the volatility associated
with energy and commodities fluctuations, which reduces portfolio risks (Horsch
& Richter, 2017, Reboredo, 2018). The purchase of green bonds by private
investors can reduce their exposure to riskier carbon-intensive bonds as the
volatility of green bond returns is disconnected from fluctuations driven by oil
prices, as we empirically demonstrate in Appendix C.
The incentives for institutional investors help to solve saving-investment
imbalances, as investors hold assets on portfolios with lower return-risk impacted
by QE - as Morana & Sbrana (2019) report for catastrophe bonds. Indeed, QE
has been widely implemented in advanced countries after global financial crisis
but should also be analyzed in the context of endogenous and exogenous risks for
financial stability. In order to address those risks, a green QE (with green bonds
purchase, eg.) can accelerate the transition (De Grauwe, 2019; Matikainen et
al., 2017).
Overall, recent literature seems to support the view of Arrow and his co-
authors who have argued from early on that, given the yield sensitivity of envi-
ronmental projects, public organizations have a role in supporting such projects
which, otherwise, would not be implemented by private firms’ bond issuance
8The CPI (2019) shows that, for climate finance, private investors accounts for 56% of
total investment but only 1.5% is financed by institutional investors. Bielenberg et al. (2016)
suggests that increasing institutional investors role is key for financing the sustainable infras-
tructure gap: they estimate a potential increase of US$ 1 trillion to US$ 1.5 trillion a year
(these investors currently hold around US$ 120 trillion in assets).
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only. Furthermore, green bonds have recently emerged as a relevant instrument
for public issuers, private investors and portfolio holdings: green bonds can de-
crease portfolio risks, in particular in the light of oil price driven volatility of
other assets returns (see Appendix C).
3 Governments and multilateral organizations
in the green bond market
Though Governments and Multilateral organizations are relevant drivers of the
green bond market, there are also significant private corporate green bonds
issued and traded. Beside ownership, one has also to take account of bonds
maturity, ratings and countries risk (and income groups).
3.1 The green bond market – An overview of the Bloomberg
database
The Bloomberg terminal provides a special label identifying the bonds issued
as “green bonds”9. From 2010 to 2018, 1,452 green bonds were issued, with
an average maturity of 7.78 years10. Table 1 shows how these bonds are dis-
tributed by capital ownership11, rating, maturity12, countries income group13
and country of risk14.
9This label is based on the issuer self-declaration while other sources, such as the Climate
Bonds Initiative, publish only certified bonds.
10We are not taking account US municipalities bonds, given its specificity and the fact that
we were not able to get monthly yields to this type of bonds (in order to calculate the beta
price). During this period, around 4,000 municipalities bonds were issued in the US.
11The Government bonds consider bonds issued by Governments or state-owned firms and
banks. The Multilateral bonds are issued by international financial institutions such as mul-
tilateral and regional development banks (listed Table B.2).
12Although the sample maturity mean is 7.78 years and its median is 5 years, capital market
agents define that long-term bonds have more than 10 years while short-term has less than 5
years and intermediate between 5 and 10 (Kenny, 2019).
13Following the World Bank classification available at:
https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519-world-bank-country-
and-lending-groups .
14Bonds face different risk premia depending of their country of risk. The yields data shown
in section 3.2 are likely to reflect the interest rates and country’s risk premia.
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Table 1: Green bonds database Bloomberg (2010-2018), Note: The Bloomberg
sample contains 1,452 bonds, except US municipalities bonds.
Table 1 shows that the sample has a larger share of private issuers, short-
term bonds and a well-balanced risk profile. Also, the bonds are mostly issued in
high-income countries (United States and European Countries) although China
is also relevant15. We also classified each bond by the “use of proceeds” and
found that mitigation projects can be financed by 98.12% of the bonds (75% are
allowed to invest in renewable energy, 40% in low-carbon transport and 35% in
green building or water management) while only 26% of the bonds can be used
for adaptation projects16.
Since 2010, green bonds leveraged US$ 442 billion in the market (US$
316 million in 2010 and US$ 143 billion in 2018). The Figure 2 shows the evolu-
tion along time of the green bonds issuance and how this amount is distributed
across distinct issuers. We observe that the growing path of the green bonds’
volume is driven by the increasing role of the private and public agents. In the
next section, we analyze in detail the yield and beta prices of these bonds.
15Banga (2019) lists market barriers that prevent developing countries from entering the
green bonds market such as: the lack of knowledge, inappropriate institutional arrangements,
minimum size requirements, the currency of issuance and high transaction costs.
16It adds up to more than 100% as the data is based on the issuer self-declaration of
potential investments at the time of the issuance. The definitive allocation of resources is
defined ex-post.
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Figure 2: Green bonds: volume issued by capital ownership in billions USD
(2010- 2018), Note: The green bonds data were obtained through Bloomberg.
3.2 Green bond yields and capital costs
Capital Markets are characterized by credit constraints and there are uncertain-
ties and costs associated with environmental projects and with the implementa-
tion of new green technologies. Given those features, we should verify whether
Governments and Multilateral organizations can help to re-price risk and de-risk
financial assets that are used for green investments. For this purpose, we study
the yields and the beta price for green bonds.
The yield is the return an investor gets on a bond. Usually, investors
accept taking more risk when bonds exhibit higher yields. The Bloomberg
database provides the current yield for each bond. The beta price is a measure
of relative risk of an asset in relation to the overall market. The higher the
risk, the higher the beta (roughly, a beta greater than 1 indicates that the
bond is more volatile, and thus more risky, than the market). The beta price
for the green bonds is calculated based on the monthly yields for each bond
(using the last 12 months observations) and on a stock markets index (S&P
500). It’s measured through the ratio of the covariance between the green bond
and market returns and the variance (risk) of the bonds monthly yields. The
average beta price is weighted by value. We also control its risk and yield by
maturity, grouping the bonds by short and long maturity.
The current yield distribution, obtained through a Kernel density17, is
17For Kernel density methods in R, see http://lmdvr.r-forge.r-
project.org/figures/figures.html
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shown in Figure 3 by issuers’ capital ownership (Private, Governments or Mul-
tilateral) and maturity (short or long). Based on this density, we evaluate the
bonds returns (current yield) and its volatility (measured by the distribution
of standard deviations, a proxy for risk). A first check gives us the following
results: Private bonds have, on average, higher return-risk ratio in compari-
son with Governments and Multilateral bonds18: for long maturities, this ratio
is 1.96 for Private, 1.27 for Governments and 1.47 for Multilateral; for short
maturities, this ratio is 1.34 for Private, 1.26 for Governments and 1.18 for Mul-
tilateral. Thus, this difference is greater for long maturity bonds19. We should
also observe in Figure 3 that, for Private bonds, the yield increases with the
maturity which is not observed for Governments and Multilateral bonds. For
these two types of bonds, we observe lower yields and less volatile for long-term
bonds20.
Figure 3: Green bonds current yield (%): density estimation by issuers’ capital
ownership (mean and standard deviation per maturity – short and long)
Sustainable infrastructure projects are known for being long-term projects
18We measure this ratio evaluating the returns over the volatility (Current Yield/Standard
Deviation), a proxy for the sharpe ratio.
19For long maturities, the sharpe ratios are driven by the lower returns and lower volatility
of public bonds. For short maturities, it’s driven by the lower returns for Government bonds
and by the higher volatility of Multilateral bonds.
20This reversal of the yields of long and short-term Government bonds presumably is arising
also from the fact that there is a reversal of the term structure of sovereign bonds in many
countries in recent times.
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that demand more stable and long-term finance sources. Also, as seen in section
2 (and in Figures B.1 and B.2, Appendix B), borrowers pay significantly higher
interest rates in developing countries. For the green bonds database, we find
the same conclusion: upper middle-income countries bonds exhibit an average
yield of 7.93 while high-income countries have a yield of 1.51 (Table B.1, in
Appendix B). Indeed, the distribution for Private and Government bonds have
double-peaks also due to the distinct risk profile of issuers or countries in the
sample as there is a group of non-investment grade bonds (and bonds issued in
middle-income countries) that are paying higher yields.
Overall, Governments and Multilateral agents seem to act de-risking
investment projects by issuing green bonds – resulting in lower return-risk ratio
- to support projects that otherwise would not be undertaken or would pay
higher risk premia. Note that these are still general results whereby we do not
compare conventional and renewable energy bonds. This issue is studied in the
end of this section and in Appendix C.
The beta price is another relevant measurement to assess bond risk.
This is particular important for green investments’ capital cost. The average
beta price, weighted by volume, is shown in Table 2 grouped by the issuers’
capital ownership and by maturity. Although the whole sample consists of
1,452 bonds, we have 690 bonds with available monthly yields for 12 months.
The sample shows that the average beta price is low (0.17) and get lower for
short-term bonds, especially for those issued by Governments and Multilat-
eral organizations. However, for longer maturities, the Governments bonds are
riskier than Private and Multilateral bonds. This presumably comes from the
fact that there are countries with high sovereign risk ratings which spillover to
green bonds risk. We apply a detailed analysis of the beta distribution in the
observations for each type of bond, considering the effect of a bond duration.
Table 2: Green bonds: beta prices by issuers’ capital ownership and maturity
(weighted mean for the 12 months beta price), Note: The beta prices are based
on data obtained through Bloomberg and Standard & Poors.
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The distributions for the beta prices, obtained via a density estima-
tion based on the non-parametric kernel smoothing method proposed by Racine
(2008), are shown in the Figure 4 by capital ownership and maturity21. We ob-
serve that the distribution of Governments and Multilateral bonds differs from
the whole sample. Multilateral bonds have a beta price mean lower than the
Private bonds (0.09 versus 0.14) and a slightly lower standard deviation (0.29
versus 0.43). Government bonds have a beta mean slightly lower than Private
bonds (0.12 versus 0.14) and a much lower standard deviation (0.19 versus 0.43).
Nevertheless, we observe a heterogeneity between countries which means that
the sovereign risk of countries also matters and impacts a bonds beta price and
thereafter the capital costs. Table B.1 (Appendix B) shows that the WACC, the
beta prices and the yields are usually lower for high-income countries and higher
for middle and low-income countries. For Government bonds, the sovereign rat-
ing matters and should be taken into account as countries with better financial
market access and better rating have a greater capacity to de-risk green invest-
ment.
Figure 4: Green bonds: beta price density estimation per issuers’ capital own-
ership (mean and standard deviation, 12 monthly yields)
However, the greatest beta price differences are observed in the Multi-
lateral bonds distribution. It seems that, although the public sector may act
21We should observe that the beta for each group is calculated by the weighted mean while
the distributions in Figure 4 report the simple mean.
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de-risking green investments, a greater de-risking effort has been undertaken by
Multilateral organizations if we look only at the beta prices. Although the den-
sity estimation shows a lower risk for Multilateral bonds, we should also verify
if the term-profile of the bonds is impacting the bonds’ beta. For this purpose,
we generate the distributions for the Government and Multilateral bonds’ beta
with long and short maturities (Figure 5). We observe that Government bonds
with longer maturities are riskier than those with short maturities (have higher
betas). However, we do not find the same pattern for Multilateral bonds. The
beta distribution remains very similar for both maturities. It reinforces the
role of Multilateral organizations in fostering green investment also in middle
and low-income countries. Banga (2019) recommends the use of development
banks as intermediary institutions for green bond management to solve existent
constraints for developing countries. Indeed, countries with lower capacity to
de-risk bonds, due to their poor financial situation, may access loans and grants
supplied by these institutions.
Figure 5: Green bonds density estimation by maturity: Multilateral and Gov-
ernment (mean and standard deviation, 12 monthly yields)
The analysis of yields and beta prices by capital ownership and maturity
provides evidence that Multilateral organizations and Governments can play a
role in de-risking green investments through green bonds issuance. In addition,
green bonds are also less impacted by oil price fluctuation which decreases these
14
bonds’ volatility due to economic cycles. Reboredo (2018) shows that the green
bond market only weakly co-moves with the fossil fuels markets which brings
hedge and diversification opportunities to investors.
In Appendix C, we apply harmonic estimations for the oil price changes,
for the returns of the S&P Green Bonds Index and for the returns of the S&P 500
Energy Corporate Bond Index (a more comprehensive index that also includes
carbon intensive energy assets). It shows that the swings in volatility of the
oil prices mainly spillover to fossil fuel based bonds. We also run a linear
regression model using these estimations and find that the oil price variations
have a greater impact on the energy corporate bond returns than on green bond
returns. Thus, green bonds are good instruments for risk hedging against certain
market fluctuations and for de-risking of investments.
We add to this fact the empirical evidence that Government and Multi-
lateral bonds show lower yields and also lower volatility for long-term bonds in
comparison to Private bonds. These yields are rather low if we compare them
with the credit cost in many developing countries. Furthermore, the beta anal-
ysis shows that Multilateral bonds exhibit lower beta prices and that maturity
does not increase their risk profile. Based on this analysis, we run a model to
simulate the market impact of de-risking bonds for renewable energy firms who
are entering the energy market in which the incumbent firms are still using fossil
fuel technologies.
4 A Dynamic Model
Next, we introduce a dynamic evolutionary model of technical change and firm
competition. As mentioned, our model is particular influenced by the evolu-
tionary approach in economics (Arthur, 1989), following a Schumpeterian view
of innovation dynamics. It also incorporates features of the work of Gaskins
(1971), Judd & Petersen (1985) and Kato & Semmler (2011).
Our work is distinct in several aspects from traditional studies that
use a static theory of the firm22. First, renewable energy firms (innovators)
22In recent modeling efforts of modeling the energy sector, a static profit-maximizing theory
of firm competition is a widely used method. Kotlikoff et al. (2019), for instance, present an
energy sector, represented by firms extracting non-renewable resources and firms producing
clean energy through a production function using capital, labor and land. From the static
maximization function, they derive the profit maximization conditions for both types of firms.
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enter the market and compete with existing energy firms (incumbents) for en-
ergy production. Their success depends on the initial conditions, interaction
effects with the incumbents, financing constraints and debt level. Second, the
innovating firms pursue an intertemporal pay-off function. Their optimization
problem is not based on a static production function. Third, our model allows
us to detail the innovating firms’ operational and financial costs together with
their debt management while they expand in the market. Though the innovat-
ing firms can temporarily have negative cash flows, we give a proof under what
conditions the sustainability of debt dynamics is provided.
Some of these distinctions can also be found in energy firms modeling in
the climate-change literature (Kotlikoff et al., 2019; Acemoglu et al., 2012). On
the third difference, we should note that we introduce finance as an instrument
of public de-risking effort. We don’t observe finance in other climate models.
Yet, our model shares a common theoretical background with others models in
climate economics - see Acemoglu et al. (2012). Similarly to our approach, those
models are adapted for the case of two sectors (green and brown energy). Our
model is inspired by models in which both energy sources are substitutes and
returns to scale of the new technology matters. Note that climate models allow
the existence of negative externalities from carbon-intensive energy use. This
raises the issue of how fiscal policy should counteract the negative externalities.
Given these effects, we explore the role of the public sector in solving this market
failure by the implementation of green energy, based on carbon taxation and
subsidies (as in Acemoglu et al., 2012). Furthermore, we consider only set up
costs in the renewable energy firm pay-off function as its main input (wind and
sun light, eg.) is free while fossil fuel firms face environmental and input costs
(oil and coal prices).
4.1 Model Specification
We present a small-scale model of two types of firms modeling the behavior of
the innovators (renewable energy firms) and the incumbents (fossil fuel firms).
We thus assume that there are heterogeneous firms in the energy sector. One
type of firms are the incumbents: the large scale fossil fuel energy firms that be-
have passively. Another group of firms enters the energy market implementing
While Kotlikoff et al. (2019) have a finite decision horizon for the households’ optimization
horizon, we presume this for the firms’ optimization problem.
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low-carbon technologies, possibly leading a less carbon intensive energy sector.
We assume that the market entrants (innovators), pursuing the supply of renew-
able energy, exhibit an intertemporal pay-off function. This approach is related
to some models of dynamic limit pricing23, although it is distinct due to the
fact that the incumbent is not dominantly pursuing an intertemporal strategy
of profit maximization. We thus presume that the established incumbents are
passively reacting to the new innovations in energy supply. However, we pro-
pose that they can learn and adopt partially the new technology for low-carbon
energy supply.
While established incumbents are passively reacting to the new in-
novations in energy supply, we assume that the entrants (the low-carbon en-
ergy firms) undertake innovations to increase their market share by expanding
the number of firms. They may follow a joint pay-off maximizing strategy,
g(x2, x3, u), whereby x2 is the number of innovating firms, x3 is the external
debt and u is their effort toward green innovations, with u ∈ Ω+. Note that
we could make the proposition that both types of firms have an intertemporal
pay-off function but this would lead us to a complicated differential game set
up.
As mentioned, our model of such heterogeneous firms in the energy
sector, and their quite complex interactions, is inspired by the evolutionary
approach in economics, developed by Brian Arthur (Arthur, 1989). This is
frequently called the Schumpeterian view of innovation dynamics. Since much
modern theory of this direction relies on the replicator dynamics, we will stylize
the interaction of our heterogeneous firms in such a way. We thus may assume
different types of interaction effects between the firms: a predator-prey relation
between the innovators and incumbents, a cooperative effect ; and a competition
(or crowding) effect24.
The multi-period pay-off function of the innovators, subject to con-
23See Judd & Petersen (1985) and Gaskins (1971), for models in which the dominant firms
determine prices through entry preventing price setting. See also Kato & Semmler (2011)
for a model in which dominant firms combat new entrants by building up entry-preventing
capital.
24The predator-prey relation occurs when innovators grow at the expense of the incumbents.
The competition effect results when the new technology becomes known by others and quickly
diffuses. The excess profit, for example, falls because of reduced prices and compressed mark-
ups. We use an inverse demand function to specify this effect. The two groups of firms also
gain from each others’ success. Finally, the cooperative effect relies on spillovers or learning
effects that bounds the number of incumbents away from zero, so that, although firms exit,
complete extinction of incumbents does not occur.
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x˙1 = k − ax1x22 + bx2 − x1e/µ (1)
x˙2 = x2(ax1x2 + vg(x2, x3, u)− β) (2)
x˙3 = rx3 − g(x2, x3, u)− τx23 (3)
The three types of interaction effects among the two types of firms are
incorporated in the state equs. (1) - (3). The pay-off function of the inno-
vating firms also plays a role in the state equs. (2) and (3) and is given by:
g(x2, x3, u) = µ(x2, u)x2u− cu− c0x2 − rx3 , where µ(x2, u)x2u is the net rev-
enue ( µ(x2, u), being the (net) price, or markup) and the remaining terms are
the costs. The cost cu is independent of the number of firms and cox2 is a cost
depending on the number of firms: cu + c0x2 is the total amount of resources
spent to innovate and rx3 is the interest on the external debt x3.
The equs. (1) - (2) depend on the mark-up µ = α/(Φ + x2u) which
represents the effect the entrants have on the incumbents in (1) and also on the
innovators in (2). The terms k, α, β, c, r,Φ, γ and v are constants and positive.
Further information on parameters is summarized in Table 3. Furthermore, x1
represents the number of incumbents, x2 the number of innovators, x3 the ex-
ternal debt and u is the effort to create new technologies (e.g., hiring engineers,
buying patents, running research labs), a decision variable related to the intro-
duction of renewable energy. This investment is usually risky since there are
uncertainties and the technological and market risks involved over time.
We first limit our model to a deterministic version: if the pay-off in-
creases, x2 rises proportionally to the pay-off (excess profit attracts entry); if the
x2 increases, it impacts negatively the pay-off (and reduce the excess profits).
In the equ. (2) the term vg(·) , in which v is a constant, means that there is an
increase in the number of innovators proportional to their excess profit. This
is a quite conventional determination of the entry dynamics, whereby excess
profits attracts entry, and the excess profits erode if the number of those firms
25For the detailed numerical procedure to solve our model variants see Appendix A.
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rises.
Table 3: Simulation parameters
We should have a further look at the equs. (1) - (3). The term ax1x2
means that when the number of firms applying the new technology grows, the
accessibility of the incumbents to that technology also grows. Therefore, the
rate of decrease of the incumbents in (1) may increase innovators in (2). The
term bx2 in (1) reflects the cooperative effect of x2 on x1. This represents the
learning gains of the incumbents when they improve their performance as the
information about the new technology spreads and the competitive pressure on
the incumbents increases due to the new technology. The term ax1x
2
2 represents
the predator-prey interaction where the adoption of the new technology is sup-
posed to take place proportionally to the product of x1 and x
2
2. The last term
x1e/µ is the crowding effect for x1: when x2 increases this term increases and
x1 decreases.
The state equ. (3) represents the evolution of the external finance of
renewable energy firms through loans from banks or bonds issuing (r is a fixed
return on debt given by x3). If g(x2, x3, u) is positive, there is a repayment of
liabilities; if it is negative, there is an increase of liabilities of the innovating
firms. The latter can generate perils of debt non-sustainability. In order to
avoid this, we employ a type of Bohn term (Bohn, 1998) that prevents debt
instability and generates debt sustainability.
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4.2 Derivation of debt sustainability
In the basic model above we have added to the equ. (3) the term −τx23 that
represents the firm’s behavior when it is threatened by debt non-sustainability.
This is a type of Bohn term 26 and generates a mean-reversion of the debt. For
private firms with a chosen investment plan, our model defines that the debt
increase changes the firm financial strategy towards a debt control strategy at
“refinancing points” (Strebulaev, 2007). Also, as advocated by the financial
hierarchy theory, financial needs change as the business grows: firms switch to
more costly sources, from internal to external finance, using first debt and then
equity (Semmler, 2011). On the other side, this strategy may lead firms to turn
fixed assets into liquidity, repay part of the debt and issue equity instead, which
decreases firms’ leverage. In the following, we derive that the debt term −τx23
matters for our debt dynamics in the sense that it stabilizes the evolution of the
debt.
For the mathematical proof that the term −τx23 is relevant for the debt
stabilization we rewrite our dynamic system (1)-(3) in a compact form. We
define
V (xo, u(.)| :=
∫ ∞
0
e−rtg(x2(t), x3(t), u(t))dt (4)
and
V ∗(xo) := max
u(.)
V (xo, u(.)) (5)
s.t.
˙x1(t) = k − ax1(t)x2(t)2 + bx2(t)− ex1(t)/µ(x2(t), x3(t), u(t))− β (6)
˙x2(t) = x2(t)(ax1(t)x2(t)
2 + vg(x2(t), x3(t), u(t))− β) (7)
˙x3(t) = rx3(t)− g(x2(t), x3(t), u(t))− τx23 (8)
with u(t) ≥ 0, and
26Bohn (1998) adds this type of term to include the effect of a change of government behavior
due to the debt increase. There is a positive response of the primary surplus to changes in
debt level.
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x3(t) ≥ 0, t ≥ 0 (9)
and x(0) = x0.
Furthermore, g(x2, x3,u) = µ(x2, u)x2u − cu − c0x2 − rx3; µ(x2, u) =
α/(φ+ x2u), and x :=(x1, x2,x3)
′.
It is possible that the state constraints can become active in our model.
Such an issue is discussed as a continuation of solutions where the equ. (9)
is active, see Bonnans & Hermant (2008), Bonnans & Hermant (2009) and
Bonnans & Shapiro (2000). Considering the specification of the model with
τ = 0 and without the pure state constraint, equ. (9), the objective value either
becomes −∞ or +∞, as is shown in the following. Yet, note that a positive τ
(a Bohn term) stabilizes the evolution of the debt. The objective function (4)
can be rewritten as follows, using equ. (8):
V (xo, u(.)| :=
∫ ∞
0



















(x2uα)/(φ+ x2u) = α (14)
yielding for x3 ∈ R. Note that we have:
lim
u,x2→∞
g(x2, x3, u) = lim
u,x2→∞
(α− cu − c0x2 − rx3) = −∞. (15)
Moreover, for x2 or u bounded the expression µ(x2, u) results in:
lim
t→∞(x2uα)/(φ+ x2u) = α (16)
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Hence equ. (8) yields
lim
t→∞
˙x3(t) ≥ 2rx3(t) (17)
and therefore
lim
t→∞x3(t) ≥  ∗ limt→∞ e
2rt (18)
Plugging this into equ. (13) we find
x3(0)− lim
t→∞ e
−rtx3(t) ≤ x3(0)−  ∗ lim
t→∞ e
rt (19)
Depending on the sign of  we either find for equ. (5) that V ∗(xo) = −∞
for  > 0 and V ∗(xo) =∞ for  < 0. Thus if we add the term τ > 0 this would
generate mean reversion and the system stabilizes.
5 Economic effects of de-risking green invest-
ments – Numerical results
Next, we undertake numerical explorations of dynamic variants where we assume
the term τ > 0 and thus presume the system stabilizes. Yet, before we get to the
numerical results let us discuss what interest rates we will use. As demonstrated,
interest rates can be de-risked. We thus will explore the effects of low (de-risked)
and high (not de-risked) interest rates. We also will allow for endogenously
generated interest rates depending on the level of debt. We thus will discuss
two versions of the model: one in where the variable r is fixed and an alternative
version in where r = f(x3) and is variable, depending on the level of x3. In the
latter case, we represent r as a logistic function of x3 :
r = 0.04 + (0.3− 0.04)/(1 + e−10(x3−0.3)) (20)
In equ. (20), r = 0.04 is the lower bound, r = 0.3 is the upper bound
and x3 = 0.3 is the debt turning point in which r increases faster. This logistic
function is shown in the Figure 6.
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Figure 6: Variable r from a logistic function
Considering two types of behavior of the interest rate, we verify the
impact of a de-risking strategy based on the cases of fixed and varying interest
rates when firms have low or high mark-ups.
5.1 Case 1: Fixed low interest rate versus fixed high in-
terest rate
We solve the maximization problem using NMPC for a deterministic case (see
Appendix A). For one case, we have a low fixed de-risked interest rate and, for
the other case, the investors face a very high interest rate. For the former, we
follow the Government and Multilateral long-term green bonds average current
yield (r = 0.02).27 For the latter, we follow the lending interest rate data
available for non-European countries (Figure B.2, Appendix B) in which we
find that in 25% of these countries the borrowing cost is between 0.14 and 0.6,
being several of them concentrated around 0.2. Therefore, we use r = 0.2. We
run the model for an initial number of incumbent firms (x1(0)) equal to 5
28and
27Regarding the inflation rate: we neglect the inflation rate as a driver for the real interest
rate, since most countries are in a low inflationary environment. For the use of a real interest
rate to drive the real debt dynamics, see Ernst et al.(2017).
28For a reference to set the number of incumbent firms, we consider, in the European
OECD countries, the share of renewable energies in the total capacity of electricity genera-
tion (excluding hydro-energy). For 2017, it was around 16% of the total capacity. We also
assume that the incumbents have a multiple of the productive capacity of the entrants. See:
https://data.oecd.org/energy/renewable-energy.html .
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an initial number of innovator firms (x2(0)) equal to 1, for distinct levels of
initial debt (High or Low) and for different mark-up levels (High or Low).
For the case of a high mark-up (Figure 7), the model shows that de-
risking the interest rate stabilizes the debt level at lower levels (closer to zero)
while it keeps the number of innovator firms high. In a non de-risked scenario
with a high initial required debt, the debt sharply increases and stabilizes at
2 while the number of entrant firms (x2) increases at the initial periods but
shrinks right after. This movement is accompanied by a sharp decrease in the
number of incumbent firms (x1). In a de-risked scenario, it is always the case
that x2 increases and x1 decreases while the system stabilizes at a lower debt
level (close to zero). The lower interest rate allows the system to stabilize with
a lower debt level at the same time it keeps the number of innovator firms high.
Figure 7: Non-derisked versus de-risked interest rate with a high mark-up in a
high and low debt scenario (x1(0) = 5, x2(0) = 1)
When firms operate with a low mark-up, the role of a de-risked interest
rate is also relevant (Figure 8). However, the low interest rate as such may not
be enough to keep the number of innovating firms (entrants) high as they may
carry negative pay-offs for a longer time: in all the simulations, x1 decreases
rapidly and x2 increases initially but sharply decreases later. This movement is
faster if the amount of the debt is higher at the initial period or if the interest
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rate is not de-risked. However, the low credit cost avoids the debt increase that
is observed in the non de-risked scenario.
If the interest rate is high, x3 accelerates and reaches a value equal to
2. This movement is also faster when the debt is high at the initial stage. If the
interest rate is de-risked, x3 increases to a level lower than 1 and greater than
0.5 but decreases when x2 reaches levels lower than 1. Therefore, in case of a
long period of negative pay-offs, de-risking of the interest rates decreases the
likelihood of debt explosion but is not sufficient to keep the number of innovator
firms high. There is a shake-out of the number of renewable energy firms.
Figure 8: Non-derisked versus de-risked interest rate with a low mark-up in a
high and low debt scenario (x1(0) = 5, x2(0) = 1)
5.2 Case 2: Fixed interest rate versus variable interest
rate
Next, in Case 2, we test the effect of de-risking investment through a fixed
interest rate versus a variable interest rate, given by a logistic function such as
depicted in Figure 6. We can compare the outcome of this new simulation with
those relying on a fixed interest rate (Case 1, Figure 7 and 8). We simulate the
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model for the case in which x1(0) = 5, x2(0) = 1, the debt is high or low and
the mark-up is high or low. The results are shown in Figure 9. Analyzing the
impact of the new interest rate on the debt, we observe that the debt increases
and reaches x3 = 3 in almost all the simulations - except when we have a high
mark-up and a low debt. The debt is more likely to increase and the system
reaches higher debt levels when the interest rate is given by a logistic function.
In Case 1, the debt does not sharply increase when the interest rate is de-risked.
When it is not de-risked, the debt increases to x3 = 2 in a low mark-up scenario
and to x3 = 3 in a high mark-up scenario with high debt. This different result
has to do with the fact that the new interest rate moves together with the debt
level, as the risk-premium increases.
Furthermore, the number of innovators (x2) and of incumbents (x1)
decrease in almost all the simulations shown in Figure 9. In Case 1, it happens
only when the mark-up is low. The interest rate movement also impacts nega-
tively the pay-off function via the financial cost increase. At a certain moment
of time, when x2 increases, the debt growth damages the innovators’ profits and
the new firms leave the market. The outcomes obtained in the Figure 9 show
that a fixed interest rate (in contrast to a variable interest rate) can guarantee
the existence of innovator firms in the market and avoid a sharp debt increase.
On the other hand, the variable interest rate movements increase strongly the
debt which impacts the pay-off function of the renewable energy firms and may
induce them to leave the market.
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Figure 9: Variable interest rate with a high and low mark-up in a high and low
debt scenario (x1(0) = 5, x2(0) = 1)
5.3 Case 3: De-risked bonds and green fiscal reform
Several countries have been using fiscal incentives in order to disincentivize car-
bon intensive activities (through carbon pricing) and incentivize green energy
(subsidies for investments or current expenses), as discussed in Section 2. New
green investments can be fostered by decreasing the interest rate paid on the
debt (e.g., de-risked green bonds) but also by reducing the future operating
cost (e.g., subsidies to decrease operational cost). Although carbon pricing can
induce low-carbon transition, high capital and upfront costs demand the com-
bination of green bonds and carbon taxation as de-risking instruments (Steckel
& Jakob, 2018; Heine et al., 2019), since an increasing scale is likely to lead
to decreasing cost, see Figure 1. We adapt the model to verify the effect of
de-risking bonds (or not) in an economy in which the Government taxes the
carbon industry and provides subsidies for renewable energy activities.29
In order to do this, we change the equ. (1) and the pay-off function of
29For a similar approach see Acemoglu et al. (2012), where fossil fuel firms that are gener-
ating negative externalities are taxed and non-polluting firms are subsidized.
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the model, decreasing the mark-up for the incumbent and increasing the pay-off
for the entrants, with the new parameter ρ, which is the carbon taxation, equal
to the subsidies for green investments. The new equations are bellow:
g(x2, x3, u) = µ(x2, u)x2u− (1− ρ)(cu+ c0x2)− rx3 (21)
x˙1 = k − ax1x22 + bx2 − x1e/(1− ρ)µ (22)
For the adapted model, we set ρ = 0.09. This level is based on the US
current subsidies to renewable energy activities, published by Lazard (2018)30.
Also, we simulate two scenarios, one in which we have a low fixed de-risked
interest rate and the other in which the innovators face a very high fixed interest
rate. We run the model for a low mark-up when, at the initial stage, debt is
high or low and x1(0) = 5 and x2(0) = 1. We find a different outcome from the
last section for the case in which the interest rate is de-risked. In this case, the
subsidies enhance the outcomes obtained by a de-risked interest rate, avoiding
a decrease in the number of innovators and keeping the debt level around zero.
The Figure 10 shows the model simulations under a low mark-up sce-
nario. When the interest rate is not de-risked, we obtain outcomes similar with
the results shown in the Figure 8. When the interest rate is de-risked, the debt
remains around zero and the number of entrant firms remains greater than 2
when the debt is low or high. Therefore, the number of renewable energy firms
does not decrease at a certain point in time and the debt remains on a stable
path, at a very low level. Therefore, as the pay-offs do not remain negative
for a long time, the x2 path changes and the subsidies avoid a shake-out in the
market.
30For solar energy, the subsidies are up to 9% of the operational cost.
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Figure 10: Non-derisked versus de-risked interest rate with a low mark-up in a
high and low debt scenario with subsidies (x1(0) = 5, x2(0) = 1)
Overall, as all of our cases show, the debt dynamics is always stabilized
and, in that sense, is sustainable, due to the term −τx23. Yet, in some cases the
stabilized path of debt may exceed the acceptable level of debt for the creditors
and may trigger unpleasant responses from the creditors. At what threshold
this will occur is more of an empirical and institutional issue not treated in this
paper.31
5.4 Outlook for a stochastic version
In the previous simulations, we solve the maximization problem using NMPC
for a deterministic case only. Nevertheless, the literature shows that market
risks - the risk of losing market share - also matters for the success of new
technologies. To address those risks, we introduce a stochastic version of the
model using a NMPC algorithm for a stochastic case (Appendix A). This is
done by a simplified version of the model, without debt dynamics but including
a new state equation that generates shocks that allow us to simulate the market
31For an extensive discussion on this issue, see Semmler (2011), chapter 20.
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success or failure of the innovator firms. We get, however, similar results as for
the deterministic case, in the previous sections.
The multi-period pay-off function of the innovators in discrete time







x1(t+ 1) = x1(t) + 0.01(−ax1(t)x22(t) + bx2(t)− x1(t)e/µ) (24)
x2(t+ 1) = x2(t) + 0.01x2(t)(ax1(t)x2(t) + v(g(x2(t), u(t))− β)) (25)
+ ψ + δlog(x3(t))x2(t)
x3(t+ 1) = e
ρ¯log(x3(t))+σz (26)
We include a new objective function of the innovating firms with the dis-
count factor δ and with a pay-off function without the debt equation: g(x2(t), u(t)) =
µ(x2(t), u(t))x2(t)u(t) − cu(t) − c0x2(t). Therefore, we have a new variable
x3, now representing the exogenous shocks given by z (an i.i.d. random vari-
able), amplified by σ (the standard deviation) and depending on ρ¯ (the per-
sistent parameter for shocks)33 . Those shocks impact the performance of the
innovator firm, thus impacting the dynamics of x2(t + 1) through the term
ψ + δlog(x3(t))x2(t).
We solve this new model for the variant case with a low mark-up (Figure
11). We observe that the model behavior is similar to the case of the determin-
istic model for a lower mark-up and a de-risked interest rate (Figure 8), in
which the number of fossil fuel firms (x1) decreases rapidly and the number of
renewable energy firms (x2) increases initially but decreases later. However, we
should note that the stochastic model is based on a discrete-time system and is
32For the detailed numerical procedure to solve our model variants see Appendix A.
33For this new version, improvements also in x1(t + 1) and x2(t + 1) were implemented
to guarantee the model stability. Due to these improvements, we have the following new
parameters: δ = 0.95, ρ¯ = 0.9, σ = 0.5, ψ = 0.05, and δ = 0.05. Furthermore, z is an i.i.d.
random variable.
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solved with small steps which demands more iterations to reach a similar out-
come. Nevertheless, the use of the deterministic case, as shown in Figure 8, is
a good proxy for the market dynamics of the stochastic case. In the stochastic
case, there are additive market shocks which can generate multiple paths for the
evolution of the innovator firms. Yet the overall direction of outcomes shows
close similarity to the deterministic case. We can compare Figure 8 and Figure
11 and see how similar the stochastic case with no debt is to the deterministic
case with a de-risked interested rate, in which r is closer to zero.
Figure 11: Stochastic version of the model with a low mark-up and σ = 0.5
(x1(0) = 5, x2(0) = 1)
6 Conclusions
The dynamics of the credit market is key for the investment behavior, but agents
risk evaluation can increase costs and limit borrowing and investment. These
constraints tend to be higher in developing countries, smaller firms and for
projects with higher uncertainty, such as environmental projects. In the latter
case, the role of Governments in the financial market is relevant in risk-bearing
investments and attracting institutional investors to climate resilient securities.
We verify that Governments and Multilateral organizations can act de-risking
green bonds and support the transition to a low carbon economy.
We find that Governments and Multilateral bonds have lower volatility
and higher yields, especially for long maturities, which keeps the return-risk
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ratio higher for Private bonds. In particular, long-term Private bonds exhibit
higher yields than long-term Government and Multilateral bonds. Sustainable
infrastructure projects are known for being long-term. We later add to these
findings empirical evidence that green bonds are a good hedging instrument
against assets exposed to oil price fluctuations - as conventional energy bonds
are, see Appendix C. It reinforces the green bond’s role as a de-risking tool.
We also find that borrowers pay significantly higher interest rates in
developing countries, depending on the country risk classification. Therefore,
our results add to the evidence that Governments and Multilateral agents can
act de-risking projects by issuing green bonds to support projects that otherwise
would be left aside. On the investors’ side, it brings with it a lower return-risk
investment opportunity and reduces the climate and financial instability risks
due to climate change. It opens some space for a green QE that can de-risk assets
exposed to climate risks. Yet, we should note that whereas Multilateral agents
do not seem to depend so much on a country’s risk classification, particular
countries do.
As concerning capital costs for investments, we find that the mean for
the beta price is higher for Private bonds and lower for Multilateral and Gov-
ernments bonds. However, analyzing the beta distribution, we observe that,
in some countries, long-term Government bonds can be riskier than Private
bonds. Indeed, we find that the beta price, the current yields and the WACC
vary between countries. Countries with lower sovereign risk have lower capac-
ity of de-risking green investments. On the other hand, the maturity does not
influence the beta price for Multilateral bonds. Thus, these organizations can
de-risk green investments for middle and low-income countries that have capital
markets and sovereign debt constraints.
Based on the above considerations, we run a dynamic model with two
types of firms - innovating firms (renewable energy firms) and incumbents firms
(fossil fuel firms) - and verify the impact of a de-risking strategy with a low
fixed de-risked interest rate versus a variable or higher fixed interest rate. For
fixed interest rates, the de-risking strategy stabilizes the debt level and keeps
renewable energy firms in the market. However, when the innovating firms
exhibit negative pay-offs for a longer time, de-risking the interest rate may not
be sufficient to keep the number of innovators high and avoid a shake-out in the
market. For a variable interest rate, the dynamics is more likely to reach high
debt levels due to the increase in the interest rate with the debt evolution. The
debt increase also impacts the pay-off function and the number of innovating
32
firms sharply decreases when the debt reaches a certain level. Therefore, a de-
risked and fixed interest rate increases the likelihood of reaching a sustainable
debt scenario (with debt control and positive number of new innovating firms)
in case of negative pay-offs. Though, in all cases the debt level is stabilized at
some level, yet in some cases the level might not be sufficient for creditors.
Furthermore, given that several countries have provided fiscal incentives
in order to foster the transformation of the energy sector, we adapt the model
to verify the effect of de-risking bonds in an economy in which the Government
taxes the carbon industry and provides subsidies for renewable energy activities.
We find that subsidies combined with a de-risked interest rate can avoid a
shakeout of innovating firms and keep the debt at lower levels when firms have
low mark-ups. An active fiscal policy complement the benefits of a de-risked
interest rate as the pay-offs do not remain negative for a long time.
Finally, we should note that the deterministic case does not take account
of market risks. We run a stochastic version, in section 5.4, to address this issue
and find a result similar to the deterministic case with a very low interest rate.
Furthermore, we have treated the incumbents as passively behaving firms. We
have left out their pay-offs and debt dynamics since this would have made our
model overly complex. It can be considered in a future extension of the paper.
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Appendix A: Deterministic and stochastic
numerics
Deterministic case
For the numerical solution of the deterministic model presented in section 4
and the numerical results in section 5 we do not apply here the dynamic pro-
gramming (DP) approach as presented in Gru¨ne & Semmler (2004). DP faces
the problem of the curse of dimension. We here use a procedure that is easier
to implement. We are using what is called nonlinear model predictive control
(NMPC) as proposed in Gru¨ne & Pannek (2012) and Gru¨ne et al. (2015).
NMPC only computes single (approximate) optimal trajectories at a time. To
describe the NMPC procedure for the deterministic case we can write the opti-






x˙(t) = g(x(t), u(t)), x(0) = x0 (A.2)
By discretizing this problem in time, we obtain an approximate discrete





where the maximization is now performed over a sequence ui of control values
and the sequence xi that satisfies xi+1 = Φ(h, xi, ui). Hereby h > 0 is the
discretization time step.
The procedure of NMPC consists in replacing the maximization of the






for a truncated finite horizon N ∈ N with xk+1,i = Φ(h, xk,i, uk,i). Hereby the
index i indicates the number of iterations. Note that neither δi nor ` nor Φ
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changes when passing from (A.3) to (A.4). The procedure works by moving
ahead with a receding horizon.
The decision problem (A.4) is solved numerically by converting it into
a static nonlinear program and solving it by efficient NLP solvers, see Gru¨ne &
Pannek (2012). In our simulations, we have used a modification of NMPC, as
developed by Gru¨ne & Pannek (2012), in their routine nmpc.m, available from
www.nmpc-book.com, which uses MATLAB’s fmincon NLP solver in order to
solve the static optimization problem. Our modification employs a discounted
variant of the NMPC MATLAB version, see Gru¨ne et al. (2015).
Given an initial value x0, an approximate solution of the system (A.1)-
(A.2) can be obtained by iteratively solving (A.4) such that for i=1,2,3, that
solves for the initial value x0,i := xi the resulting optimal control sequence by
u∗k,i , but uses only the first control ui := u
∗
0,i and iterates forward the dynamics
xi+1 := Φ(h, xi, ui) by employing only the first control. Thus, the algorithm
yields a trajectory xi, i = 1, 2, 3, . . . whose control sequence ui consists of all the
first elements u∗0,i of the optimal control sequences of the finite horizon problem
(A.4). Under appropriate assumptions on the problem, it can be shown that
the solution (xi, ui),which depends on the choice of N in (A.4), converges to the
optimal solution of (A.3) as N →∞, see Gru¨ne et al. (2015). A demonstration
that this “turnpike property” holds is shown in Gru¨ne et al (2015). It operates as
a receding horizon problem, such that for example in step i = 1 with the decision
horizon N = 4, it is iterated forward 6 times, thus we have i = 1....6. The
solution is then the outer envelop of the piecewise solutions using the horizon
N = 4 multiple times, in our case 6 times.
The main requirement in these assumptions is the existence of an opti-
mal equilibrium for the infinite horizon problem (A.1)-(A.2). If this equilibrium
is known, it can be used as an additional constraint in (A.4), in order to improve
the convergence properties. In our solution of the model in section 5, we did
not use the terminal condition to solve the model but moved forward with a
receding horizon to find the (approximate optimal) trajectories. Thus, without
a priori knowledge of this equilibrium this convergence can also be ensured.
Stochastic case
The stochastic case is illustrated here by a simple problem. We show here
how this works for a discrete time pay-off function and discrete time one state
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variable dynamics, for details see Gru¨ne et al. (2015). The NMPC is applied
to a stochastic problem using the certainty equivalence principle. Since there
is not much work of a NMPC type algorithm for this problem we only sketch
here a currently available NMPC algorithm. Due to the fact that the control
generated by the NMPC algorithm is in feedback form, the basic concept can










with the discrete time stochastic dynamics
x(k + 1) = ϕ(x(k), u(k), zk), x(0) = x0, (A.6)
where the zk is an i.i.d. random variable. This problem could a priori be given
in discrete time or it could be given as the time discretization of a continuous
time stochastic optimal control problem as in the above deterministic case of
section 4.
From a computational point of view, the main difficulty in stochastic
NMPC is the efficient solution of the corresponding finite horizon problem (A.4)
which now becomes a stochastic optimal control problem whose solution is com-
putationally considerably more expensive than in the deterministic case. While
some NMPC approaches in the literature indeed solve stochastic optimal control
problems, here we follow the simpler certainty equivalence approach, see Gru¨ne
et al. (2015) which does in general not compute the true stochastic optimum
but in the case of stochastic perturbations with low intensities may still yield
approximately optimal results. In this procedure then, we replace the stochastic
dynamics by its expected counterpart




, xe(0) = x0 (A.7)






Note that we only use (A.7) in order to solve (A.8) in step (1) of the NMPC
algorithm. In step (2) we simulate the closed loop solution using the original
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stochastic dynamics (A.7) with zk realized by appropriate random numbers.
We illustrate the performance of this approach by a two dimensional
stochastic version of the stochastic growth model. We extend a discrete time
one dimensional dynamics using a second variable modeling a stochastic shock.
The model is given by two discrete time equations
x1(k + 1) = x2(k)Ax1(k)
α − u(k) (A.9)
x2(k + 1) = exp(ρ¯ lnx2(k) + zk) (A.10)
where A, α and ρ¯ are real constants and the zk is an i.i.d. random variable
with zero mean. The pay-off function in this simple case of a stochastic growth
model can be g(x, u) = lnu.
In a numerical computation in Gru¨ne et al (2015) the following pa-
rameters were used: A = 5, α = 0.34, ρ¯ = 0.9 and δ = 0.95 and zk is an
i.i.d. Gaussian random variables with zero mean and variance σ2 = 0.0082.
Using that E(exp(a + zk)) = exp(a + σ
2/2), the model used for the open loop
optimization is then given by





α − u(k)) = xe2(k)Axe1(k)α − u(k) (A.11)
xe2(k + 1) = E(exp(ρ lnx
e




The optimally controlled dynamics is given by x1(k + 1) = αβAx2(k)x1(k)
α.
The above setup is then extended to solve our stochastic case of section
5.4, however leaving aside the debt dynamics. We include a pay-off function
that is more complex then in the above stochastic growth model, and two state
variables, the dynamics of the innovative and incumbent firms. We also add
a third state variable, the stochastic process, as (A.10) in the optimal control
problem of the stochastic growth model, and (A.11) and (A.12) in the simulation
of it using a random number generator.
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Appendix B: Data Presentation
Figure B.1: European countries’ lending interest rates, Source: Eurosystem -
European Central Bank. Available at https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/home.do
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Figure B.2: Non-European countries’ lending interest rates - greater than 14%,
Source: World Bank. Available at https://data.worldbank.org/
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Figure B.3: Non-European countries’ lending interest rates - lower than 14%,
Source: World Bank. Available at https://data.worldbank.org/
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Table B.1: Green bonds: average beta, average current yield and WACC per
country
Notes: (1) The highlights were chosen based on the lower and highest value; (2)
WACC estimated by Ondraczek et al. (2015). Total is based on the complete
list of 143 countries, eliminating four who are not classified by the World Bank
by income. Sample is the average WACC for the 22 countries, in which the
WACC and beta were calculated; (3) In the lower middle-income group, the
beta was obtained only for three countries: India, Nigeria and Indonesia. In the
upper middle-income, for 5 countries: Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, Mexico,
South Africa. In the high-income group, for 17 countries.
African Development Bank
Asian Development Bank
Central American Bank for Economic Integration
Corporacion Andina de Fomento
Eurofima
European Bank for Reconstruction & Development
European Investment Bank
International Bank for Reconstruction & Development
International Finance Corp
New Development Bank BRICS
The Nordic Investment Bank
North American Development Bank
Table B.2: List of Multilateral organizations issuing green bonds (2010-2018)
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Appendix C: Harmonic estimations of bond re-
turns and oil price changes
In order to assess the volatility of green bonds and other types of bonds due
to energy price fluctuations, we compare market indices for different types of
assets with oil price variations. The oil price changes are given by the European
Brent oil spot price annual variation for every month from February/2011 to
September/2019. For asset returns, we use, for the same period, the annual
monthly total returns of the S&P Green Bonds Index (which contains renewable
energy and others green assets) and the S&P 500 Energy Corporate Bond Index
(a more comprehensive index that also includes carbon intensive energy assets).
Given that asset allocation decisions are based on low frequency move-
ments in asset returns, we use the securities data to estimate low frequency
movements in asset returns by using harmonic estimations (see Chiarella et al.,
2016). We apply the Fast Fourier Transformation (FFT) method on the de-
trended real bond returns and oil price variation. We get empirical estimations
based on linear regressions constructed with trigonometric functions: we fit each








(t− to)) + bicos(2pi
τi
(t− to))) (C.1)
We estimate the harmonic regression model for different values of k, from 1 to 6,
which represents different frequencies - from low frequencies to high frequency
data. For our analysis, we selected the estimation with the lower squared error
term (shown in Figures C.1, C.2 and C.3). Although we observe similarities
between the features of the three cyclical movements, yet the downturns and
upturns of the S&P Green Bond Index returns are clearly less associated with
oil price changes over time. Thus, green bonds appear to be better hedging
instruments than oil price driven assets.
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Figure C.1: S&P Green Bond Index Annual Total Returns and Harmonic Esti-
mation
Figure C.2: S&P 500 Energy Corporate Bond Index Total Returns and Har-
monic Estimation
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Figure C.3: Oil price Annual Changes and Harmonic Estimation
In order to verify this relationship, we run the following linear regres-
sions using the harmonic estimation values. These regressions evaluate the in-
fluence of oil prices cycles in the returns to investors of green bonds and energy
corporate bonds34:
GreenBonds = α0 + α14OilPrices+ Trend (C.2)
EnergyBonds = β0 + β14OilPrices+ Trend (C.3)
For the period from January/2012 to September/2019, the estimated
coefficients for the equations C.2 and C.3 show that the fluctuations of oil prices
have a greater impact in the energy bond returns as shown in Table C.1. The
estimated coefficient for green bonds is α1 = 0.06 while the one for energy
corporate bonds is β1 = 0.12. Although the green bonds have been implemented
in 2010, we start the regressions in 2012 as it took a while for market agents to
adjust the issue of a new product, as shown in Figure 2 (Section 3.1).
34We also add a simple trend model to the regression, having a time index t as a dependent
variable, affected also by a random noise. It generates a predictor for the dependent variable
for the next periods if a clear trend is observed.
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Table C.1: Green bonds and Energy Bonds - estimated coecients for the regres-
sions C.2 and C.3
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